Length beats complexity
A long random passphrase usually outperforms a short password with symbols. Use a password manager and unique passwords.
Compare random-password resistance for bcrypt cost 10 on a GPU cluster, then switch to cost 5 or 12.
Choose a hash family and hardware profile; the table updates immediately.
| Length | 0-9 | a-z | a-z, A-Z | a-z, A-Z, 0-9 | a-z, A-Z, 0-9, symbols |
|---|
A long random passphrase usually outperforms a short password with symbols. Use a password manager and unique passwords.
The model assumes an attacker already has the hash and can test guesses locally. Online logins behave very differently.
bcrypt, Argon2id, scrypt, and high-cost PBKDF2 make every guess expensive and change the table dramatically.
bcrypt makes every guess deliberately expensive through its configurable cost. This page starts at cost 10 and 16× RTX 5090 for the Hive 2026 scenario; both cost and hardware remain editable.
The cost controls the work factor; increasing it by one approximately doubles the computation required per guess.
For random passwords, added length rapidly expands the search space, but the outcome still depends on cost and attacker hardware.
Yes. Switch the hash option while keeping hardware and length constant to compare the tables.